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T

his EAP completes 29 years of
publication and includes “items
of interest” and “citations received.” Two important books
dealing with the phenomenology of place
have recently been published, and we highlight their front covers, below, and feature
additional information in “book notes.”
The first volume is a 2nd edition of philosopher Jeff Malpas’ groundbreaking
Place and Experience: A Philosophical
Topography, originally published in 1999.
This expanded version includes a new
chapter on place and technological modernity, “especially the seeming loss of place
in the contemporary world.”
The second book note describes EAP editor David Seamon’s Life Takes Place:
Phenomenology, Lifeworlds and Place
Making, which argues that, “even in our
mobile, hypermodern world, human life is
impossible without place.” Seamon gives
particular attention to the generative as-
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pects of place and locates six place processes that he identifies as place interaction, place identity, place release, place realization, place intensification, and place
creation.
This issue of EAP includes two essays,
the first by the late philosopher and science
educator Henri Bortoft, who focuses on
ways of thinking holistically, including the
conceptual efforts of proto-phenomenologist Johann Wolfgang von Goethe; physicists Niels Bohr and David Bohm; and
philosophers J. G. Bennett, Edmund
Husserl, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
The second entry is by retired environmental educator John Cameron, who begins a new series of essays on the lived relationship between interiority and exteriority, particularly as qualities of the natural
world and place contribute to that relationship. EAP readers will remember Cameron’s earlier set of essays, “Letters from
Far South,” that focused on his homesteading experience on Bruny Island, Tasmania.

Summer/Fall ▪ 2018

Items of interest
A summer seminar intensive, “Let the Phenomena Speak!” is sponsored by upstate
New York’s Nature Institute, June 24–
28, 2018. Participants will engage in careful observation and accurate description of
natural phenomena via first-person, experiential encounter grounded in the phenomenological science of Goethe. http://natureinstitute.org/.

The Portland Urban Architecture Research Lab (PURAL) is sponsoring their
annual conference on the work of architect
Christopher Alexander, best known for
his influential book, Pattern Language. To
be held in Portland, Oregon, October 24–
28, 2018, this year’s conference theme is
“Migration, Refugees, and Patterns.” EAP
editor David Seamon is a keynote speaker
and will present “Ways of Understanding
Wholeness: Christopher Alexander’s
Work as Synergistic Relationality.”
The peer-reviewed Ecopsychology focuses on the links between human health,
culture, and the health of the planet. The
journal “seeks to reshape modern psychology by showing that it cannot stand apart
from an intimate human connection with
the natural environment. We need that
connection with nature to do well mentally
and physically, let alone to flourish, as individuals and as a species.”
The journal will publish a special issue
on “Children and Nature,” co-edited by
Judy Braus, executive director of the
North American Association of Environmental Education; and Sarah Milligan
Toffler, executive director of the Children
and Nature Network. The editors are interested in both empirical and theoretical papers as well as evocative essays.
http://www.liebertpub.com/overview/ecopsychology/300/.
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Citations received
Ian Angus, 2018. Crisis, Biology, Ecology: A New Starting
Point for Phenomenology?
Journal of the British Society
for Phenomenology, vol. 49,
pp. 1-13.
This philosopher explains that, particularly
in his 1935 The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl focused “on a critique of the formal-mathematical paradigm
of the physical science of nature” and suggested “the possibility of biology as the exemplary science” rather than physics. Angus argues that the science of ecology
might be a more comprehensive starting
point for Husserl’s “radical inquiry into the
grounding of the idea of science.” For Angus’s justification of this claim, see the
sidebar, below.

Biology, ecology, and lifeworlds
[I]f biology is concerned with the specificity of… life-forms and their worlds,
then it does not seem to adequately
capture the interaction between these
life-forms and worlds that constitutes
the “life” of the lifeworld. Scientific
ecology began with precisely this distinction between biology as a morphological science of characteristics of
species considered independently and
ecology as a science of the interaction
between species and non-living
forms….
The set of relationships within a
pragmatically delimited place constitutes a whole through achieving a certain balance between its interacting
parts. It is this concept of balance
which most clearly adds to the biological concept of life to which Husserl reverted in seeking a concept of scientific striving not bound to the exemplary role of mathematical physics….
Speaking teleologically, we may say
that the concept of an ecosystem is a
way of conceptualizing the Whole that
is the universe of all that is through relationships of dependence and maintenance by the community of all beings.
Humans, as one species of these be-

ings, depend upon this Whole. A particular grouping of humans, humans
within a larger community of beings in
a given place circumscribed by an elastic boundary, develop the specifics of
their culture in relation to the specifics
of the local ecology….
Indeed, insofar as humans are dependent on the ecology of their life,
and, as Husserl asserted, humans understand other life-forms by analogical
transfer from their own sense of life,
human understanding of the sustaining
balance of other life-forms seems to be
essential to the meaning of humans
themselves and to thereby confer a
sense of intrinsic worth on that ecology.
Ecology as a limited but encompassing science stands at the threshold of a
reconsideration of, not only embodied
subjectivity, but also worth and ethics
insofar as humans are dependent on it.
It would thus appear to have a greater
claim than biology to being a science
of continuity with lifeworld experience. It would therefore not only be
crisis-free but would motivate conceptual abstractions that aim at scientific
understanding of living relationships
(I. Angus, p. 9, p. 11).

Elizabeth A. Behnke, 2018.
Phenomenological Reflections on the Structure of
Transformation: The Example
of Sustainable Agriculture.
Filosofija Sociologia, vol. 29,
no. 1, pp. 21-31.
This phenomenologist writes that the purpose of this paper is twofold: “First, I want
to suggest that the very practice of phenomenology itself includes transformative
elements, prefiguring a possible kinship
between phenomenologists and environmental advocates or other proponents of
cultural change. But I also want to take
some preliminary steps toward a phenomenological analysis of a topic in which issues of both the ‘natural’ and the ‘cultural’
environment are woven into a single (and
sometimes fragile) fabric: namely, the food
we eat. This in turn will entail some investigation into certain parallels between the

constitution of the ‘physicalistic thing’ in
the objective natural-scientific attitude and
the constitution of the ‘commodity’ in the
commercial corporate attitude…. In this
way, I hope to present phenomenology as
a living tradition with much to contribute
to our current crises and challenges—and
to the cultural transformations they call
for” (p. 21). See the sidebar, below.

Mundane and transcendental
phenomenologies
[One can identify] two main approaches through which phenomenology can recognize and honor values
beyond those of the commercial corporate attitude: namely, mundane phenomenology (lifeworldly phenomenology, phenomenological psychology)
and transcendental phenomenology.
The former is typically reached by
placing scientific knowledge in brackets and returning to the world of prescientific experience, a move for which
Husserl often uses the term Rückgang
(going back); the latter, for which Husserl often uses the term Rückfrage
(asking back), takes the phenomena—
and their horizons—as clues (Leitfaden) from which to inquire back into
the corelative attitudes, assumptions,
interest, achievements, and essential
styles of constituting (inter)subjective
life. Following the latter path would
accordingly require, for instance, more
detailed analyses of the ways in which
the world is constituted for such dominant knowledge systems as the corporate mentality through such categories
as consumers, commodities, and profits….
On the other hand, we must also
continue to (re)establish the legitimacy
of situated lifeworldly experience and
its values; here the accent lies on further description of patterns of lived
meanings, just as they are experienced
in the natural attitude, within the subject-relative contexts we study. Such
work is particularly crucial to save endangered local knowledge systems,
and thereby to foster a biodemocracy
in which both biodiversity and the diverse communities that ultimately sustain it can be restored to health and
wholeness.
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These, then are at least two of the
main ways in which phenomenology
offers us the possibility of a new scientificity that can provide the intersubjective verifiability we require while preserving not only the subject-relatedness
that makes our earth a surrounding
world or “environment” (Umwelt) in
the first place, but also the situated
world-relatedness that makes us human.
It is true that phenomenological investigation might not, in and of itself,
feed a starving person, or renew depleted soil, or restore the pollinators
killed by pesticide, or heal the air and
the water of a wounded planet, or halt
the globalization of the corporate mentality. Like a seed, however, the retrieval and rehabilitation of the experiential dimension is capable of unfurling into something beyond itself, implying a world in which it can truly
flourish.
Thus for me, the task of phenomenology in a time of political crisis, cultural change, and environmental challenges is not only to clarify our predicaments, but also to contribute—in
whatever way possible—to transforming our traditions in ever more fruitful
ways (E. Behnke, p. 29).

Jelena Bogdanović, ed., 2018.
Perceptions of the Body and
Sacred Space in Late Antiquity and Byzantium. London:
Routledge.
The nine chapters of this edited collection
consider “the Christian understanding of
the body and sacred space in the medieval
Mediterranean.” The chapters are organized in three parts: “the immaterial and
placeless sacred”; “the sacred made palpable”; and “the sacred delivered.” The editor’s aim is “a better understanding of the
corporeality of sacred art and architecture.” See the sidebar, above right, which
is a section from the editor’s introduction
discussing contributors’ contrasting conceptual perspectives.

The sacred and corporeality
[In current research on the sacred and
its corporeality, there is a scholarly
split] in the very definition of the sacred and how the sacred related to the
forces (agents) that mediate the sacred
and the capacity (agency) of the sacred
to act in a given locale….
[F]or some researchers, the sacred is
a constructed sociopolitical discourse
amongst humans as agents, recurrently
studied as cohesive, idealized groups
as mediatory forces that allow us to address the agency of the sacred through
the contextualized materials world.
Other scholars align with teleological
views, looking at the final causes, design, and purpose in the abstract,
wherein the material world is acting as
an agent and is mediating the ideal, divine agency.
In each case, human agency and the
locale of the sacred remain present in
these scholarly debates. Human agency
is examined either through the human
body most literally understood or
through various material objects that
reflect the embodiment of human encounters with the holy, while the locale
of the sacred is habitually examined
through various material forms of
framing the sacred space (J. Bogdanović, p. 2).

Christine Varga-Harris, 2015.
Stories of House and
Home: Soviet Apartment Life during the
Khrushchev Years.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Univ. Press.

many aspects of this enormous state initiative—from neighborhood planning to interior design—sought to alleviate crowded,
undignified living conditions and sculpt
residents into ideal Soviet citizens.”
Khrushchev aimed for a separate-apartment arrangement that marked a major
shift in living space from communal to one
family-dwelling, such as the unit illustrated in the plan below, which was designed for a nuclear family of three (upper
right, bath; lower right, kitchen; left, the
main “common room,” marked out into
“zones” for leisure, study, and sleep).

Stephanie Meeks with Kevin
C. Murphy, 2016. The Past
and Future City: How Historic
Preservation is Reviving
America’s Communities.
Washington, DC: Island
Press.
This book argues that “the preservation of
historic buildings and places is essential in
the present and future world of urban planning,” with a focus on the United States.
One central question asked by Meeks is
“what makes a building loved?” The author argues that “historic preservation is
not only important for the emotional sake
of humans, but that it can and should play
a significant role to ensure a more sustainable and environmentally friendly future
for our planet.”

This historian offers a “social
and cultural history of the
massive construction campaign that Khrushchev instituted in 1957 to resolve the
housing crisis in the Soviet
Union and to provide each
family its own apartment.
Drawing on archival materials, as well as memoirs, fiction, and the Soviet press,
Varga-Harris shows how the
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Derek J. Paulsen, 2013. Crime
and Planning: Building Socially Sustainable Communities. NY: Planners Press/CRC
Press/Taylor & Francis.
This criminologist argues that “the form
and layout of a built environment has a significant influence on crime by creating opportunities for it and, in turn, shaping community crime patterns.” Topics discussed
include “connectivity, mixed-use developments, land use and zoning, transit-oriented design, and pedestrian trails, greenways, and parks.” Includes a discussion of
what Paulsen identifies as the two main design approaches to prevent crime: what he
calls “connectivity” (including space syntax) vs. “enclosure” (including Oscar Newman’s defensible space).

Martino Stierli, 2013. Las Vegas in the Rearview Mirror:
The City in Theory, Photography, and Film. Malibu, CA:
Getty Research Institute.
This Swiss art historian uses Las Vegas as
a case study to examine American megacities and urban sprawl. Drawing particularly on Venturi, Scott Brown and
Izenour’s 1972 Learning from Las Vegas,
Stierli considers “the way architectural
theories of modernism and postmodernism
were questioned in a context of radical and
rapid social change…. [He envisions] a
methodology for understanding the… impact of signs in the urban context of megacities.” Includes discussion of Gordon
Cullen, Kevin Lynch, Donald Appleyard,
Phil Thiel, and Peter Blake.

Julian Thomas, 2006. Phenomenology and Material
Culture, in Handbook of Material Culture, Christopher Tilley, Webb Keane, Susanne
Küchler, Michael Rowlands,
and Patricia Spyer, eds. London: Sage, pp. 43-59.
This anthropologist argues that “the ideas
of the phenomenological tradition have
been highly influential in the study of material culture, although their source has not

always been explicitly acknowledged.”
Thomas reviews the phenomenological
perspectives of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas; he then discusses
work in the human and social sciences that
have drawn on phenomenological themes
to better understand aspects of material
culture, particularly buildings, places, and
landscapes.
He uses an essay by anthropologist Tim
Ingold on basket weaving to illustrate the
process of human making: “weaving is… a
paradigm of what human beings do when
they create artefacts, a skillful crafting that
knits things together” (p. 54). The sidebar,
below and right, is reproduced from
Thomas’s conclusion.

An interrogation of the everyday
Phenomenology developed out of an
imperative to secure Western science
by ascertaining the precise relationship
between consciousness and the material world….
Since the scientific revolution of the
17th century, Western thought had relied on the notion that science had
privileged access to the fundamental
nature of the universe. Husserl had implicitly claimed that phenomenology
was concerned with an order of reality
that was more primordial than that addressed by the natural sciences.
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, by arguing that our most basic understandings can only be generated in the context of a social and phenomenal world,
transformed phenomenology from a
search for abstract essences to an interrogation of the everyday.
This shift from the transcendental to
the immanent can be understood as
part of a more general 20th-century
trend, which acknowledges the importance of ordinary life. In turn, we
could identify the emergence of material culture studies with this growing
interest in the quotidian.
What distinguishes phenomenology,
however, is a desire to see the everyday as an appropriate location for attending to the deepest of existential
questions. A mediation on a discarded
shoe [Heidegger] can lead into a questioning of the nature of art, and so on.
This is because the tradition refuses to
separate philosophical knowledge from

the world of things, while viewing
thinking as an embodied practice, and
sees no observation, however, mundane, as immune from an unending critique. Phenomenology consequentially
has an invaluable contribution to make
to the investigation of material culture,
but it must do this without relinquishing its critical spirit.
More precisely, it is clear that the
full potential of phenomenological approaches to material culture is far from
having been realized. While experiential analyses of architecture and landscape in present and past contexts have
been undertaken, these have often concentrated on the visual and (to a lesser
extent) the tactile aspects of human engagements with space and place….
By comparison, portable artefacts
have been less intensively studied from
a phenomenological standpoint than
places and structures. Ingold’s account
of basket weaving opens the way for
new approaches to a variety of forms
of “making”…. Moving beyond the
conventional focus on production and
consumption [in archeology], an investigation of the haptic qualities of objects might prove productive, particularly in the context of the mass-produced material culture of the contemporary West, where the impact of phenomenological thought has been slim.
Finally, a keystone of the phenomenological approach is the understanding that the “subjective” aspects of experience are not superficial elements
constructed on the bedrock of an invariant materiality, but are the means
through which the material world reveals itself to us. It might therefore be
instructive to consider the question of
the variable ways in which the (presumably culturally constructed) moods,
attunements and emotional states of
people in a variety of contexts disclose
their material surroundings and conditions to them (J. Thomas, pp. 56-57).
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Book Note
Jeff Malpas, 2018. Place and Experience, A Philosophical Topography, 2nd edition. London:
Routledge [1st edition published in 1999 by Cambridge University Press].
…For places are places for experiences
of every actual or imaginable sort. Conversely, experiences are nothing if not
emplaced: without a place in which to be
present and to be situated, an experience
would evaporate into think air—thus
would not be the experience of an experiencer, a sensing or thinking or feeling
subject, and thus no experience at all.
With the phrase “place and experience,” we are not talking of a tautology
here but of a profound identity, or better,
of what Plato called an “indefinite dyad,”
in which each term is essential to the
other even if the terms of the relationship
may not be objectively discernable (p. xi, xii).

W

hen the first edition of philosopher Jeff Malpas’
Place and Experience was
published in 1999, it
marked a major advance in place thinking
begun with philosopher Edward Casey’s
Getting back into Place, published in
1993. Both thinkers argued that place and
lived emplacement are an integral part of
who and what we are as human beings As
Casey writes in his thoughtful forward to
the new edition of Malpas’s book:
It is notable that Malpas is not so much
interested in “place as experienced” as in
“place as a structure within which experience (as well as action, thought, and
judgment) is possible” [Malpas 2018, p.
179]. This structure is not a formal a priori of experience but rather what we call
a material condition of that experience in
its many forms. As such, it is requisite for
that experience: “such placedness is a
necessary condition of our very capacity
to experience” [Malpas, 2018, p. 194]….

One of the most important questions
Malpas probes in this new edition of
Place and Experience is how, in our hypermodern, globalized world, do we find
ways to relocate ourselves in a lived emplacement that we can never as human beings escape or set aside? He writes:
“Place must persist even in the face of the
apparent loss of place.”
Though its argument is difficult and requires much concentration to master, this
book—like Casey’s Getting back into
Place—radically reconfigures our conceptual and lived understanding of how
we experience, know, and act in the
world. The following sidebars include
three passages from the book and some of
Malpas’s depictions of place-as-concept.

Descriptions of
place-as-concept
“Place is understood as an open region within which a variety of elements are brought to light through
their mutual inter-relation and juxtaposition within that region….” (p. 15).
“a bounded openness or opening….”
(p. 26)
“The crucial point about the connection between place and experience is
not, however, that place is properly

something only encountered ‘in’ experience, but rather that place is integral to the very structure and possibility of experience” (p. 31).
“fundamental to the idea of place is
the idea of an open and yet bounded
realm within which the things of the
world can appear and events can ‘take
place’” (p. 33).
“Place is that bounded open region of
possibility in which even space and
time, as well as subjectivity and objectivity, first emerge. As such a region, it is fundamentally relational,
and that relationality permeates everything that pertains to place, everything
that belongs with it, everything that
appears in its embrace.
“It might even be said that it is the
relationality of place that underpins
the idea of the essential human connection to place, since that connection
is itself a specific mode of the broader
relationality that characterizes place
as such, and so also characterizes
what is in place” (p. 40).

Only within the framework of
place
The idea of place encompasses both
the idea of the social activities and the
institutions that are expressed in and
through the structure of a particular
place… and the idea of the physical
objects and events in the world… that
constrain and are sometimes constrained by those social activities and
institutions.
There is no doubt that the ordering
of a particular place… is not independent of social ordering… however, this does not legitimate the
claim that place, space, or time are
merely social constructions. Indeed,
the social does not exist prior to place,
nor is it given expression except in
and through place—in and through
spatialized, temporalized ordering—
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and so the social cannot be that out of
which, or solely by means of which,
place is “constructed.” It is within the
structure of place that the very possibility of the social arises.
In grasping the structure of place at
issue here what is grasped is an open
and interconnected region within
which other persons, things, spaces,
and abstract locations, and even one’s
self can appear, be recognized, identified, and interacted with.
But in ‘grasping’ such a region, it is
not a matter of the subject grasping
something of which the acting, experiencing creature is independent. A region or place does not simply stand
ready for the gaze of some observing
subject. Instead, it encompasses the
experiencing creature itself, and so
the structure of subjectivity is given in
and through the structure of place.
Something similar might be said of
the idea of objectivity, at least in the
sense that objectivity is understood,
not merely as consisting in the existence of some physical entity or system, but as precisely that which can
be present to a subject. In this respect,
the idea of the object is something established only within a place, and
thereby in relation to a subject—
although, in saying this, it must be remembered that both subject and object are thereby “placed” within the
same structure, rather than one or the
other being the underlying ground for
that structure.
Of course, the existence of some
particular place… will be causally dependent on a set of physical processes
and structures, but this does not mean
that place can be simply reduced to
such processes or structures. The language of place, of self and other, of
subject and object, describes the
world in a way that is tied to the possibility of agency and attitude, not in
terms of physical process alone.
Indeed, while the existence of a
place may be causally dependent on
certain physical processes, the capacity to describe, experience, and understand those processes is, in turn, possible only within the framework of
place (J. Malpas, pp. 34–35).

Within the embrace of place
Given that the fundamental structure
of place and the relation to it cannot
be treated as anything other than a
necessary structure, the basic structure of place and the relation to place
must indeed remain much the same
now as it has been in the past. That
this is so is reinforced by consideration of the fact that the apparent loss
of place, to which [geographer Edward] Relph and others draw attention, is something that itself occurs
topologically, which is to say that it
occurs in and through the experience
of places. That it should be so is, of
course, just what one would expect
given the necessity just alluded to.
If we distinguish between, on the
one hand, place as a general and encompassing structure—the complex
bounded and interwoven structure of
spatiality and temporality—and, on
the other hand, place as it refers to individual places, each of which has its
own character…, then it is easy to see
how place must persist, even in the
face of the apparent loss of place.
Places can be objects of experience—as I experience this place or
that place—but place is also that
within and out of which experience
arises. Any experience of the world,
along with the appearing of things
within the world, will thus always be
from within the embrace of place.
What is described as the loss of
place is therefore more properly described as an experience of place in
which place is seemingly effaced in
its very presentation. I find myself
here, and yet, in being here, I find
nothing that marks off this place as
distinctive—that marks it off as just
the place that it is.
Consider this example, which will
be familiar to many: except for differences in the clothing and ethnicity of
the shoppers, being in a shopping
mall in Beijing may be almost indistinguishable from being in a shopping
mall in Sydney, from being in a shopping mall in Dubai, from being in a
shopping mall in Houston—the same
shops, the same products, the same architecture. Here is the experience of

being in a place that nevertheless also
appears in such a way that it obscures
its very character as a place, and, so,
one can say that the experience is almost like being nowhere at all…. (J.
Malpas, pp. 202–03).

Losing and regaining place
The way in which the sense of the
loss of self may be tied to a sense of
the loss of place, and the regaining of
self to a regaining of place, was a central theme in the last chapter [chapter
8]. Consideration of the topographic
and spatial effects of modern technology on action and the self merely reinforces that basic point. Taking up
new technologies is not like donning a
new set of clothes—as if the technology were something completely external that could be put on or off at will,
without making any real difference to
the body (or the self) beneath.
Technologies change us through
changing the material forms in which
our lives are embodied and expressed—through changing the ways
in which space, time, and place are
experienced and appear. This point
has significant implications, not just
for the consideration of modernity or
the technologies that reign within it,
but also for all manner of human life
and activity.
When we act, we act in ways that
are both shaped by and also, to some
extent, shaping of the specific character of the places, times, and spaces in
which we are embodied and located...
The ways in which we shape places
thus have a direct effect on the shapes
of our very lives and the lives of those
around us. This has special significance for… practices such as architecture, landscape design, urban and regional planning, interior design, and
even furniture and fashion design.
In as much as those practices deal
directly with the place, time, and
space of things, which are the very
materiality of things, they shape the
things themselves, and so shape the
possibilities that are made available
for human life. To design and build a
house, to construct a garden or plan a
town, to craft a chair or sew a gown,
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is also to touch on the shape of action,
the form of experience, the contour of
thought.
Yet even when the spatial and topographic are not directly or explicitly
thematised in some practice, place is
no less relevant or influential. Any
and every action, any and every intervention in the world, is always placed
and thereby affected by place as well
as affecting place. So, too, place is always affecting of human being, even
if only the being of the one who acts.
Place is the very medium of our lives;
that which supports us, that within
which we encounter one another, and
that which gives us space in which to
move and time for such movement.
The fundamental role played by
place is indeed unchanged by technology (because, as already noted, technology depends on place and our relation to place in order to function, even
as it also obscures place). Yet,
although limited in this way, the
changes wrought by modern technology in respect of place, and so of
space and time, remain quite radical
and far-reaching. One of those
changes is… the way different places
are entangled together in the same
places. Another is the frequently
noted phenomenon of time-space
compression, originally advanced by
geographer David Harvey and taken
up by others since….
Given the way in which the rise of
modern science, as well as modern
technology, has been closely tied to
the rise of the idea of space as pure
extension…, one can view modernity,
in general, as determined by that very
same mode of spatiality. The supposed ‘placelessness’ of the modern
world can thus be seen as a reflection
of the dominance of an almost purely
spatialised view…that is based not in
any subjective mode of spatiality but,
rather, in the levelled-out spatiality
that belongs with objectivity.
To the extent that place itself is allowed to appear in that view, it is as a

mere location within such an objective spatiality. Thus, within the structures of contemporary capitalism,
within modern financial and managerial frameworks, within the digital
media and communications networks
of today, appear no genuine ‘places’,
but only the representation of unbounded spaces containing nodes,
lines, and flows… [T]his mode of
spatiality is dominant in the writing
and thinking even among those who
attempt to theorize and critique the
structures of modernity.
Not only are there those who valorise this mode of spatiality, but, even
where it is the object of critique, the
assumption that this mode of spatiality is inevitable and ubiquitous in contemporary life means that there is no
real basis on which any genuine critique can be based. If the modern
world is indeed a “space of flows” (to
use Manuel Castells’ phrase), then
that is just what it is, and we must accommodate ourselves to it. If it results
in a change to the character of human
experience, then that is simply the
way things are, and, once again, we
can only accommodate ourselves to
that change.
The possibility of real critique depends, in fact, on recognising the way
in which the mode of spatiality,
through which modern technological
capitalism articulates and presents itself, is indeed inconsistent with the
properly placed character not only of
human being but of all experience and
all appearing—even, if we attend
closely enough, the appearing of modern technological capitalism. Critique,
in this instance, depends on revealing
the way the modern spatialisation of
the world hides the topographical
character of the world, as well as the
topography in which that spatialisation is itself embedded.
What the consideration of technological modernity demonstrates, in
spite of its own contrary self-representation (since the rhetoric of moder-

nity is so often about precisely the escape from place), is indeed the necessity of place for all appearance, and so
also the way the world itself opens up
only in and through place.
And it is not just one unique place
that is at issue here—“The centre
starts from everywhere,” writes [poet]
Kenneth White, and so, too, does the
world have its beginning in any and
every place, even though the exact
way this occurs may be different in
different places. Just as the horizon of
the visual field is not that which prevents vision but precisely that which
enables it—the abolition of the horizon being the erasure of vision rather
than its freeing-up—so place and being-placed is that which enables the
opening up of the entirety of the
world. Thus, the essential boundedness of place allows the entry into the
unboundedness of the world.
In this way, too, place appears as
the first and most primordial form of
liminality, the latter term deriving
from the Latin for threshold, limen,
and connecting with the Latin limitem
or limes, meaning limit or bound; and
place appears as essentially adventual,
as in ‘arrival’, ‘event’, ‘happening’,
or, more literally, a ‘coming to’. To
be in place is therefore to be at the
threshold of the world and to be taken
up in the happening of world.
The relation between place and
world, between limit and openness,
limit and opening, is frequently overlooked or misconstrued—whether because of the obscuring effects of technology or as a result our own tendency to introverted obsession with
ourselves. Yet even though places
may seem to change, place as such remains, and so too does the essential
relation of place and the human.
The world begins in place, but so
too do we (J. Malpas, pp. 206–09).
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Book Note
David Seamon, 2018. Life Takes Place: Phenomenology, Lifeworlds and Place Making. London: Routledge.

I

n Life Takes Place environment-behavior researcher and EAP editor
David Seamon argues that, even in
our mobile, hypermodern world, human life is impossible without place. Seamon draws on examples of specific places
and place experiences to understand place
and lived emplacement more broadly.
Advocating for a holistic way of understanding that he calls synergistic relationality, he defines places as spatial fields
that gather, activate, sustain, identify, and
interconnect things, human beings, experiences, meanings, and events.
As a hook to focus his argument, Seamon draws on the colloquial expression,
“Life takes place,” and what it might
mean experientially, existentially, and
phenomenologically. Why does life
“take” place? Does “take” mean “requires” as in the phrases “learning takes
effort” or “healing takes time”? What
could it mean that life requires place? In
today’s hypermodern times, does the
phrase even make sense as human life so
often involves autonomous individuals
making their way in worlds independent

of any environments or places in which
those individuals find themselves?
Recognizing that places change over
time, Seamon examines their processual
dimension by identifying six generative
processes that he labels place interaction,
place identity, place release, place realization, place intensification, and place
creation. Drawing on practical examples
from architecture, planning, and urban
design, he argues that an understanding of
these six place processes might contribute
to a more rigorous place making that produces robust places and propels vibrant
environmental experiences.
In the sidebars below are reproduced
Seamon’s introduction to a synergistic
approach to place and his description of
one of the place processes—place release, which most broadly refers to environmental serendipity and happenstance.
The third sidebar relates to the lived synergy among the six processes, which are
summarized, in both their sustaining and
undermining modes, in the table on p. 10.

Place as synergistic
relationality
To provide a conceptual starting point
for the phenomenology of place I develop here, I identify two contrasting
conceptual understandings of place—
what I call analytic relationality and
synergistic relationality. In analytic
relationality, place is understood as a
collection of parts among which are
arbitrarily identified a series of linkages then measured and correlated to
demonstrate stronger and weaker connections and relationships. This mode
of understanding informs much current place research, mostly in a tacit,
unquestioned way.
In contrast, an understanding of
place grounded in synergistic relationality assumes a phenomenological
perspective and works to interpret
place as an integrated, generative field
that shapes and is shaped by parts integrally interconnected in a physical

and experiential whole. The parts are
only parts as they sustain and are sustained by the constitution of the
whole….
Articulating this inseparable interconnectedness is hugely difficult because place as a whole must be understood to know its parts, yet those parts
must be understood to know the
whole of place. In this book, I argue
that the perspective of synergistic relationality contributes to an understanding of place that is more accurate, comprehensive, and usable than
an understanding grounded in analytic
relationality….
The difficult conceptual and practical matter, however, is how places are
to be looked at and understood via
synergistic relationality. If this approach to wholeness offers a more
comprehensive, processual rendition
of place, how is this knowledge to be
looked for and discerned? How, ontologically and epistemologically, is
place to be understood synergistically? These are the central questions
I address in this book (D. Seamon, pp.
21–22, p. 27).

Place release
Place release involves an environmental serendipity of unexpected encounters and events. In everyday language,
these moments of happenstance are
described by such words and phrases
as “surprising,” “accidental,” “seemingly random,” or “without clear
cause.” English incorporates a good
number of colloquial expressions for
these serendipitous events, including
“out of the blue,” “from left field,”
“without warning,” “all of a sudden,”
“not bargained for,” and “not in the
cards.”
Proceeding phenomenologically, I
am largely concerned here with explicating some of the lived features of
these unusual, unexpected moments.
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Real-world examples of place release
are meeting an old friend accidently
on the sidewalk; enjoying the extemporaneous performance of an itinerant
street musician; or becoming friendly
with, dating, and eventually marrying
the checkout clerk who just happened
to take your take-out lunch order each
work day….
[P]lace release contributes, in
smaller and larger measure, to the
pleasure of being alive, particularly in
relation to the places with which one
is most often associated. Place release
as process undermines place when the
pleasure of the place becomes unsettled or unsettling in some way. The
place less often or no longer offers
enjoyable surprises and unexpectedness; users feel less a zest for daily
life to which the place formerly contributed.
In a more crippling mode, release
as undermining place can involve disruptive, non-expected situations
whereby one is upset, frightened, or
hurt—for example, one happens by
chance to be mugged in front of the
apartment house where he or she
lives….
[Broadly, place release refers] to
encounters and happenings that cannot be foreseen or predicted from
one’s past or present experience. Such
events demonstrate that many things
in life are unforeseeable and apparently fortuitous. They may be propitious and gratifying; they may be illstarred and calamitous. A missed
train, a chance meeting, a wrong
turn—place happenings like these
may be momentary disruptions or
life-changing events. They offer refreshing or baleful possibilities.
As with the place interaction and
identity [the two place processes Seamon discusses before release], place
release demands its own thorough
phenomenology, and here I overview
three topics that future phenomenologies might explore more thoroughly:
first, the moment in which unexpected
experiences happen; second, situations in which the unexpected experience triggers a chain of consequential

place events, some of which are only
indirectly relatable to the original experience; and, third, ways that aspects
of [both the material and human
worlds] contribute to situations of
place release (D. Seamon, pp. 118–
19, p. 121).

The being and
becoming of place
Table 15.1 [see table next page] summarizes the six place processes as, on
one hand, they maintain and buoy
places; or, on the other hand, as they
undermine and shatter places. In
thriving places, the six processes mutually support and invigorate each
other at a wide range of generative
levels and environmental scales. Robust places give pleasure to their users, who in turn feel attachment to
those places and may wish to preserve
and strengthen them through responsible, well-considered actions, plans,
and constructions whereby robustness
is intensified further.
One must emphasize, however, that
the six processes can weaken place.
For example, American post-war urban-renewal programs exemplify a
mode of place creation in which policy makers and planners, partly out of
ignorance as to how places work, imposed an inappropriate mode of place
intensification that unsettled or destroyed the animated street life and
genius loci of many American cities
and their neighborhoods and districts….
Another example is superficial
modes of place intensification that incorporate inappropriate environmental
designs contributing to an erosion of
place rather than to its invigoration—
e.g., public plazas that include no
seating; megastructures that turn their
backs to the sidewalk and street; or a
hierarchical pathway structure that interferes with ease of pedestrian movement….
In examining the six processes as
they unfold in lived relationship, one
notes that the first four (interaction,

identity, release, and realization) relate more to the being of a place:
What that place is, how it maintains
itself, and how and why people are attached to that place. The processes of
place interaction and place identity
might be called the generative foundations of place and place experience,
since they point to the everyday actions, meanings, and attachments that
presuppose and ground robust places.
Through place interaction, participants identify with place for which
they feel fondness, concern—even devotion and profound loyalty. In turn,
this lived reciprocity between place
interaction and identity sustains place
release in that environmental serendipity offers the surprises and pleasures of place unexpectedness. Yet
again, a supportive reciprocity among
interaction, identity, and release energizes place realization and a distinctive atmosphere and character that,
though largely ineffable, become an
integral place quality.
If the first four processes contribute
to a synergistic understanding of what
places are and how they work in dayto-day fashion, the two remaining
processes (intensification and creation) speak to the becoming of place:
How robust places might be envisioned and actualized via empathetic
understanding and action (creation)
and well-crafted improvements in the
place (intensification).
Place creation requires dedicated,
well-informed individuals who
thoughtfully improve place, whereas
place intensification identifies the independent power of appropriate designs and fabrications to revive and
strengthen place by being one way
materially and spatially rather than
some other. The result is that place
becomes better or more durable in
some way—for example, increasing
sidewalk traffic by creatively redesigning street fronts; or enhancing
street activity by making an urban district’s pathway grid more connected
and permeable for pedestrians (Seamon, pp. 166–69).
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Seamon’s six place processes: Sustaining and undermining aspects*
Place process

Sustaining aspects

Undermining aspects

Place interaction

The goings-on in a place, both ordinary and day-to-day and out-of-the-ordinary and eventful; “a day in the life of
the place”; the daily, weekly, and seasonal “rounds” of a place.

Typical interactions of place become fewer
or destructive; the pleasure of being part of
place is undermined by discomfort, stress,
nuisance, inefficiency, fear, and so forth.

Place identity

Taking up place as a significant part of
one’s world; accepting and recognizing
place as integral to one’s personal and
communal identity; feeling that one belongs to place; unself-conscious beingin-place.

People associated with a place feel uncomfortable with taking up that place as a part of
their world; one mistrusts or feels threatened
by the people and events of the place; one
loses her unself-conscious sense of belonging to the place; one feels a lived separation
from a place that before was an essential
part of who one was.

Place release

An environmental serendipity of unexpected encounters and events; people
are “released” more deeply into themselves through gaining pleasure from
surprises-in-place.

Serendipitous events unfold that make one
anxious, unsettled, or fearful; unfortunate
surprises undercut people’s sense of security and safety.

Place realization

The power of place to generate an environmental order with a specific
rhythm, ambience, and character.

The physical and lived order of place deteriorates or disintegrates; the ambience of the
place becomes unpleasant, negative, or nonexistent.

Place intensification

The ways that the physical, material,
and spatial environment works as an
independent agent for strengthening
place; the active role played by architecture, design, planning, and policy in
making place one way rather than another.

Arbitrary, imposed plans, designs, fabrications, and policies upset and undermine
place; inappropriate constructions and interventions squelch the life of the place.

Place creation

People-in-place, out of concern and attachment, envision and reshape place
in ways whereby it is sustained and
strengthened.

Individuals and groups misunderstand place
and impose unsuitable policies, designs, and
actions that weaken place and ignore its
unique qualities and character.

*Reproduced from Seamon 2018, Table 15.1, p. 168.
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Seeing and Understanding Holistically
Goethean Science and the Wholeness of Nature—Part I
Henri Bortoft
Bortoft (1938–2012) was a philosopher, physicist, and science educator who wrote Taking Appearance Seriously (2012) and the
influential Wholeness of Nature (1996). This essay was originally the first part of a paper for the conference, “Goethean Science in
Holistic Perspective: Scientific, Ethical, and Educational Implications,” held at Columbia University’s Teacher College, New York
City, May 20–22, 1999. The essay is published with the permission of Jacqueline Bortoft. We hope to include additional sections of
Bortoft’s paper in future EAPs. Note that, in the original written version of his talk, Bortoft does not provide complete references.
Here, we have added citations as available, but some works remain unreferenced. The editor thanks Stephen Wood for assistance
in locating references. See EAP, spring, 2013, for the “in memoriam” issue devoted to Bortoft, including his essay, “The Transformative Potential of Paradox.” © 2018 Jacqueline Bortoft.

T

he central question I ask is what
contribution Goethean science
makes to understanding the
wholeness of nature. I contend
that there is something to be known about
the wholeness of nature to which Goethean
science can contribute. I was first introduced to the problem of wholeness by
physicist David Bohm (1917–1992), when
I became one of his post-graduate research
students in the early 1960s (Bohm 1980,
2003; Bortoft 1982). Today, Bohm’s name
is associated with wholeness and quantum
physics but, in fact, this topic was first recognized and explored by physicist Niels
Bohr (1885–1962), who saw that a new
factor in physics—what he called “an indivisible wholeness” and completely absent
in classical physics—arose because of the
indivisibility of the quantum itself.
Bohr was particularly concerned about
the consequences of this indivisibility for
measurement, a problem that led him to
speak of the “unanalyzable wholeness” of
the measuring apparatus and the phenomenon being measured. Faced with this concern, Bohr adopted a somewhat pessimistic
view: Although physicists might be able to
speak of the bare concept, “wholeness,”
this was all they could say. Thus, there was
no possibility of identifying a more adequate, content-filled concept of wholeness
than its “unanalyzability.”
Bohr proposed that wholeness is an irrationality in nature just as the square root of
the number two is an irrationality in mathematics. And just as the incommensurability of the length of the diagonal of a triangle with unit sides is accommodated by the
extension of the system of integers and

fractions to “cover” cases that do not fit
into that number system, so Bohr believed
it possible to accommodate the “irrational”
wholeness in quantum physics by an analogous procedure of using the concepts of
classical physics (the only physics he
thought there could be) in a way that would
“cover” wholeness, even though wholeness as such does not fit into that conceptual system.
Here, we reach Bohm’s disagreement
with Bohr: Bohm believed it was possible
to have a content-filled idea of wholeness.
The huge problem was how to do it?

T

he irreducible wholeness in quantum physics is seen dramatically in
the case of interference experiments
with a single-photon light source. There
arises the difficulty of thinking of the single photon as having a definite path as
would be the case if the photon were a classical particle. If we insist that the photon is
a classical particle, then we find ourselves
in the contradictory position of saying that
the single photon travels simultaneously in
both one path and two paths. How at the
same time can something that seems one
also seem two? Here, with a vengeance, we
have the irreducible wholeness of quantum
indivisibility. As physicist Arthur Zajonc
(1995, p. 299) explained,
Goethe was right [when he said about
light, “How often do they strive to divide
that which, despite everything, would always remain single and whole?”]. Try
though we may to split light into fundamental atomic pieces, it remains whole to the
end. Our very notion of what it means to be
elementary is challenged. Until now we

have equated smallest with most fundamental. Perhaps for light, at least, the most
fundamental feature is not found in smallness but rather in wholeness.
Completely absent from the world of
classical physics, the irreducible “quantum
wholeness” became even more evident in
the discussions between Einstein and Bohr
that eventually led to the formulation of the
paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen
(EPR) and its later reformulation in Bell’s
inequality theory (which has now received
remarkable experimental confirmation; see
Zajonc 1995). This research made evident
that quantum wholeness cannot be described in terms of independent elements
externally connected.
Quantum “non-locality” (as it is called)
seems to involve “two” objects that are far
apart physically and yet can be connected
instantaneously as if they are not separated
at all. Again, we have a situation where the
language used contradicts what one is trying to say—i.e., we are trying to describe
quantum non-locality in the language of
physical locality.
In the quantum domain, reality cannot be
broken down into independent parts and
hence cannot be analyzed (if we mean by
that word “broken apart and measured”).
At this fundamental level of presence, the
world cannot be thought of as composed of
independent parts connected together in
some way.
We do, however, continue to think in
terms of parts and whole, largely because
the very form of our language channels our
doing so. Bohm pointed to the fact that the
subject-verb structure assumed by modern
languages tends to emphasize the role of
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separate entities acting on other entities, interacting by connections external to those
entities themselves. He stressed how nouns
are the dominant form, whereas earlier languages were often verb-based and therefore did not encourage speakers to think
primarily in terms of separate, localized
entities.
Niels Bohr himself was acutely aware of
the crucial role that language plays in human understanding. In fact, it was a major
source of his epistemological pessimism
regarding quantum theory. As he explained, “We are suspended in language in
such a way that we cannot say what is up
and what is down” (Petersen 1985, p. 302).
Since Bohr assumed we cannot escape
from this situation, he thought that the only
way we could describe the quantum world
was via concepts already available to us—
i.e., the concepts of classical physics.
Hence, we had to learn how to use these
concepts in such a way as to accommodate
“irrational” quantum wholeness without
leading our understanding into contradiction. He mounted a heroic rearguard defense for a situation that he perceived as
impossible.

B

ohm thought differently and
brought attention to the relationship between forms of language
and ways we perceive and think about the
world. It was studying this relationship that
partly led to my working with British philosopher J.G. Bennett (1897–1974) on the
problem of language and the perception of
wholeness. Bennett was particularly interested in time, believing that our ordinary
language led us into wrong ways of thinking about temporal processes (Bennett
1956–1966). In my work with him, he proposed an experiment in which we adopted
an artificial language that modified the
way we describe simple actions and events
(Bennett, Bortoft, and Pledge 1965).
The aim was to see how this different
language might modify our perceptions. A
key feature of the experiment was to avoid
introducing what Bennett called “descriptive fictions”—i.e., factors introduced into
descriptions that could not be found in experience. These factors often took the form
of connecting linkages added to what was
given directly in experience—for example,
hypothetical entities functioning as hidden

causal mechanisms. Whereas what was
connected entered directly into experience,
these connections themselves did not because they were postulated speculatively.
The discipline required to describe actions and events, excluding all interpretive
fictions and yet giving a thorough description, seemed to focus our thinking in a
new, unfamiliar way (as well as evoking
states of extreme irritation and exasperation). We began to experience “breakthroughs” into a new kind of perception.
There was a transformation in the mode of
togetherness of the elements. At first, we
saw these elements only as separated from
each other but, over time, we realized they
were connected directly. In other words,
they were connected at the start and, therefore, there was no need to propose some
extra “connection” added on after the fact.
In seeing this mode of togetherness in
this transformative way, we realized that
one can see wholeness directly, where
“seeing” means phenomenological seeing
and not the empiricist’s reduction of seeing
to just sense perception [1]. Although the
context was different, we felt we had begun to learn how to do what Bohr had declared impossible: to see wholeness directly as it is in itself (Bortoft 1971).

B

ecause nothing extra is added, this
experience of transformation in the
mode of togetherness can be described as a situation where “nothing has
changed, but everything is different.”
When we see that the connections are intrinsic rather than extrinsic, separation
does not suddenly disappear. Rather, we
have both together: both separation and
wholeness. The experience is twofold but
not dual.
One can make a parallel with reading.
Consider the three letters “c,” “a,” and “t”
as they appear in the word “cat.” Perceptually, the letters appear as separate, and we
might attempt to overcome this separation
by introducing external linkages as with
“c-a-t.” This device, however, eclipses the
possibility of reading. When we recognize
the meaning “cat,” the letters remain separate but are also connected in a subtler way
than linking them together by introducing
an external connection of hyphens. This
experience of seeing the meaning in complete words (rather than as separated but

connected letters) parallels the experience
of seeing wholeness directly.
Although I didn’t know at the time, this
way of seeing is in tune with Wittgenstein’s “new way of thinking.” What I also
didn’t realize was that the transformation
in Wittgenstein’s philosophy marking his
later extraordinarily creative period was
brought about by his encounter with the
work of Goethe [2]. Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy is concerned with “the understanding that consists in seeing connections,” which for him was a kind of seeing
that did not need explanation because connections are encountered directly. This direct seeing of connections was crucial for
Wittgenstein because he saw this kind of
seeing as understanding so that seeing and
understanding are one, and there is no need
for explanation because it is replaced by
seeing. Wittgenstein emphasized that to
connect two things, we do not need a third
because things connect directly—i.e., they
already stand in connection with one another, and therefore there is no need to introduce some additional connection externally [3].

M

y first encounter with Goethe
came later and happened, by a
stroke of good fortune, when a
friend mentioned a book he thought I might
find interesting—philosopher Ernst Lehrs’
Man or Matter (Lehrs 1958), an introduction to Goethe’s way of science. In reading
the book’s fifth chapter, “The Adventure of
Reason,” I suddenly found myself feeling
completely at home. The limitation that
Kant put on the human cognitive capacity
to know wholes—“Above all, it is not
given to such a thinking to think ‘wholes’
in such a way that through an act of thought
alone the single items contained in them
can be conceived as parts springing from
them by necessity” (Lehrs 1958, p. 82)—
reminded me of Bohr’s strictures on our
ability to understand quantum wholeness
[4]. But here was Goethe declaring that he
had done in practice the very thing that
Kant declared impossible in principle for
the human mind to know [5].
In his conversation with Schiller, Goethe
had said that “there must certainly be another way altogether [rather than a piecemeal way] that did not treat of nature as di-
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vided in pieces, but presented her as working and alive, striving out of the whole into
the parts” (Lehrs 1958, p. 104). Goethe’s
work on the metamorphosis of plants illustrated this movement from the whole into
the parts, rather than aiming to move from
the parts to the whole, in the way it showed
all the different organs up to the stem as
metamorphoses of one and the same plant
organ (Goethe 1790/2009).
As I read Lehrs, it seemed evident to me
that Goethe could see the wholeness in nature directly and, more so, had developed a
set of specific practices that could lead to
this holistic way of seeing. In fact, one of
these methods—exakte sinnliche phantaisie, or “exact sensorial imagination”—was
familiar to me already from working with
Bennett. We had found that the practice of
what we called “visualization” to be extremely valuable for using the mind in a
way allowing us to disengage from the habitual activity of mental associations, a
dominant characteristic of the ordinary,
discursive mind [6].
Besides Goethe’s plant studies, there
was also his work on color (Goethe
1810/1970). Here, his insistence on staying
with the phenomenon and refusing to go
“behind” it by the artifice of introducing
hypothetical concepts or models seemed to
be the aim of my work with Bennett, albeit
our results were far inferior to Goethe’s efforts, which had produced what amounted
to an entirely new way of doing science
(Bortoft 1996; Seamon and Zajonc 1998).
I also immediately made a connection
between Goethe’s work and quantum
physics in that Goethe’s method pointed to
the renouncement not only of classical
models in physics but of all models as
such. This is the positive side of Bohr’s understanding: by insisting that all models be
renounced, he thereby returned physics to
being truly phenomenological—in other
words, returning to the original phenomena
from which physics as a science arose.

C

learly, there was much to learn
from Goethe, and I began to explore his work in detail (Bortoft
1985, 1986, 1996, 2012, 2013). At about
the same time as I began this task, Bohm
distributed draft versions of his two papers
on the implicate order, in which he took the
hologram as a metaphor for the kind of

wholeness that he saw as a fundamental
new order in physics (Bohm 1980, chaps.
6 and 7). As with Goethe, here was another
instance of going from the whole to the
part. I realized that it should be possible to
use this way of understanding to show how
the radically new direction taken by Goethe was a reversal of our habitual way of
thinking. At the same time, one could use
Goethe’s approach to illuminate Bohm’s
notion of an intrinsically implicate order. I
was never able, however, to interest Bohm
in the connection with Goethe, perhaps because he was not willing to see past scientists’ and philosophers’ typical stereotypical understanding of Goethe’s science.
Also at this time, I discovered phenomenology, which came as a revelation—an
experience of stepping into a different dimension of mind, but one that is there in
front of us all the while, only hidden from
our customary assumptions. The fundamental insight of Husserl’s phenomenology is that we see the necessary structure
of experience—the intrinsic necessity—
and not just the discrete particulars of experience that empiricism assumes. Perception is twofold: simultaneously, an awareness of contingent particulars (just the facts
as such) and perception of necessary structures, connections, and relations among the
facts (the idea as such). Empiricism does
not recognize this complementarity, collapsing the two into one, which it identifies
with sense experience only. The result is
endless confusion—e.g., the notion that
experience itself is incomplete and requires something added by “the mind.”
The key point is that we see directly the
way in which the particulars are necessarily connected. We do not infer the necessary connection by means of intellectual
speculation after seeing. We see the necessary structure directly because to know is
to see—this is Husserl’s fundamental insight and is not a metaphor. While we may
say that seeing the necessary structure in
the facts is analogous to the sensory seeing
of the facts, it would be better to turn the
phrasing around and say that sensory seeing is a particular species of seeing (instead
of being the only real case of seeing, as is
conventionally assumed).
It is the recognition of this integral togetherness of seeing and knowing that
prompted Goethe’s reply to Schiller, who

had said, “That is no experience. That is an
idea.” But Goethe responded, “I am glad to
have ideas without knowing it, and to see
them with my very eyes.”
Looking back via Husserl, we recognize
that Goethe’s statement was an attempt to
express the insight that only came later
with phenomenology—namely, that we
can and do see ideas directly, but that lacking an adequate basis for being able to say
this, Goethe made the mistake of attributing this seeing to sense perception. There
is both a positive and negative here: negative, in that Goethe was mistaken about
knowing being a matter of sense perception; positive, in that he recognized a way
of knowing that is seeing.
In one sense, Goethe was a phenomenologist, and phenomenology is a crucial way
of understanding his work, since it has always been too easy to mistake his efforts
as naïve empiricism, which is not the case
at all. It is his phenomenological way of
seeing that is exemplified to some degree
by his science of color and his work on the
morphology of plants. One finds more recent examples in the work of zoologist
Wolfgang Schad (1977) on the morphology of mammals; and the work of biologist
Craig Holdrege (1998) on seeing animals
whole. There is also the work of ecologist
Mark Riegner (1993, 1998), who examines
the wholeness of landscapes as revealed
through their flora and fauna.

A

s my work proceeded, the discovery of an unsuspected affinity between Husserl’s phenomenology
and Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was
particularly astonishing, since many commentators claimed that the two thinkers
were philosophical antipodes. What we realize today, however, is that both Husserl
and Wittgenstein, in different ways, were
working toward the same recognition: that
there is a direct kind of seeing that understands without explaining—without the
need to explain—because this way of understanding is seeing. For Husserl, to know
is to see; this aim takes the form of seeing
the necessary, intrinsic structures of the
phenomenon. For Wittgenstein, there is a
way of seeing that is also a way of understanding, which takes the form of seeing
connections—the intensive interlinkages
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wherein things are together directly because they “already stand in connection
with one another.”
In this sense, the differences between
Husserl and Wittgenstein are far less significant than their common ground: an experience of direct seeing likened metaphorically to another dimension of the phenomenon itself. In other words, what at the
start is seen as only “two-dimensional” is
suddenly seen as “three-dimensional” [7].

Goethe’s way of seeing; consequently,
Goethe’s way of seeing is illuminated by
Wittgenstein, just as Wittgenstein’s
“new way of thinking” is illuminated by
Goethean science;
▪ Husserl and Wittgenstein were, each in
his own way, really concerned with the
same kind of seeing; thus, unexpectedly,
one realizes an affinity between two
thinkers long thought to be different in
their ways of understanding.

B

As I hope the above discussion indicates,
I am interested primarily in seeing and understanding wholeness, which necessarily
requires a phenomenological science. My
concern with Goethean science is the extent to which it contributes to this science
of wholeness.

ut only with the publication of Ray
Monk’s Wittgenstein biography in
1990 (Monk 1990), did I first learn
of the crucial influence that Goethe had on
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on “the understanding that consists of connections.”
Monk claims that this emphasis on seeing
connections has no precedent in the Western philosophical tradition “unless one
finds a place for Goethe… in that tradition”
(Monk 1990, p. 316). In this sense, one
might describe the Goethean way of seeing
the wholeness of nature in the manner of
either Husserl or Wittgenstein. For example, in his perceptive study of the horned
mammals, Schad makes visible what he
calls “the awesome inner logic of the organism” (Schad 1977, p. 118), which could
just as easily be interpreted as seeing the
necessary structure or principle (Husserl)
or seeing the “grammar” of intensive connections (Wittgenstein).
Reflecting on the beginnings of my own
interest in the question of wholeness, I realize that the work done by a small group
of us with philosopher J. G. Bennett in the
1960s was unwittingly an initiation into a
wider movement in modern consciousness.
Our stumbling attempts to learn how to see
wholeness directly in things, prepared a
doorway for us to enter into a much more
comprehensive cultural stream than any of
us could have realized at the time. The
pathway I have taken since then reveals
certain unexpected affinities:
▪ Goethe’s way of seeing is illuminated by
Husserl’s
phenomenology,
which
among other things, shows us the difference between Goethe’s science and the
phenomenalism for which superficially
it can be mistaken;
▪ Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was inspired directly by his encounter with

Notes
1. At the time, because we were not aware of the
phenomenological perspective, we were not able to
make this distinction between seeing directly and seeing reduced to sense perceptions.
2. And at the time, I knew nothing of Goethe either.
3. During the time I worked with Bennett, we were
influenced by Wittgenstein in the approach we took
toward language, but his influence was mostly limited
to our emphasizing the ways in which language can
“sleepwalk” us into using concepts inappropriate for
a given situation, leading one into confusion that he
or she then mistakes for some difficulty in the situation itself—for example, a “problem” to be “solved.”
This alternative way of seeing was very much “in the
air” in Britain in the 1960s, but we were unaware of
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on a new kind of seeing—
i.e., an understanding that sees connections and thus
removes any need for explanation.
4. These strictures might have been because Bohr
had absorbed the Kantian attitude.
5. Kant’s motivation here may well have been that
he hoped to save Newtonian mathematical physics
not only from the skepticism of Humean empiricism
but also from the claims of Swedenborgian “spirit
seeing,” which for Kant posed an equal threat to what
he saw as the greatest achievement of human
knowledge—mathematical physics.
6. The capacity to form mental images intentionally was crucial for Bennett, and he sometimes called
the practice by the German word vorstellung.
7. At a 1986 seminar at London’s Goethe Institute,
philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer declared that
“Wittgenstein has the same kind of phenomenological
imagination as Husserl.” Philosopher John Heaton
told me that people in Vienna who knew Wittgenstein
in the 1930s said that he was really doing phenomenology (and this at a time when, according to the
standard Wittgenstein narrative, he was a logical positivist!).
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Invitation to Interiority 1
Inside Canyons, Inside Oneself
John Cameron
Retired environmental educator John Cameron lives on Bruny Island, just off the southeastern coast of Tasmania, the island state
south of mainland Australia. His twelve “Letters from Far South” appeared in issues of EAP from 2008 through 2017. This essay
is the first in a new series that will be continued in future EAP issues. jcameronblackstone@gmail.com. Text © 2018 John Cameron. Photographs by Trish Neil and used with permission.

W

hat is the felt experience of
inner space? If asked to
close your eyes and “go inside,” what does it feel like
and what are the sensations? Where does
this experience originate? Is it something
purely internal and different for each person, or are there external influences as
well? What does it feel like to be within a
place? Do different places engender different experiences of inner-ness?
I raise these questions because of a recent trip to the sandstone canyon country
northwest of Sydney, an experience that
left me wondering about the relationship
between the forms of the landscape we encounter and the sense of interiority within
one’s self and body.

T

he Wollemi Wilderness Area is the
largest designated wilderness area
in Australia, covering 900,000
acres. This region is a deeply dissected
plateau of predominantly Narrabeen and
Hawkesbury sandstone beds laid down to a
depth of 500 meters about 250 million
years ago. Uplift of the plateau, which continues today, caused deep vertical joints in
the rock that have been used by small
streams to begin carving narrow canyons
almost 100 million years ago, some of
which are only several meters wide, yet
hundreds of meters deep. Access is via
rough walking tracks across the dry
scrubby heathland at the top, while the
vegetation at the bottom of the canyons is
temperate rainforest with sassafras, coachwood, and tree ferns where there is insufficient light for trees to grow [1].
My first introduction to this country was
30 years ago. I vividly recall scrambling
through scratchy bushland and across exposed rock ledges for hours, finding myself
at the top of a rope ladder that seemed to

drop down into another realm. I clung to
the ladder so tightly that I grazed my
knuckles while descending the 20-meter
cliff to the accompaniment of the walk
leader’s encouraging comments that “it
was worth it.”
As I stepped back from the rope at the
bottom in relief, I discovered how right he
was. A crystalline stream ran between the
sandstone walls, creating an enclosed,
moist, ferny world. Rainforest trees towered above us in a cathedral-like space. I
looked about in wonder at this paradise I
hadn’t known existed.
I couldn’t wait to return and, for the 17
years I lived in the Greater Sydney region,
I was a regular visitor, alone and with others. Just before I left to live in Tasmania in
2005, I finally persuaded my sister Trish to
allow me to show her the canyon country

on an overnight camp. She was immediately smitten and has since become a keen
canyoneer and bush walker. On my annual visits to Sydney, she has returned the
favor and introduced me to canyons in
which I had never set foot. This year for
the first time, we carried tents and sleeping bags so that we could camp for three
days.
A fortnight before, I had been on an organized four-day walk on Bruny Island
described as a “deep ecology yatra” [2].
The leaders of the walk, loosely based on
Buddhist practices of walking meditation,
guided us on a daily cycle of largely silent
activity.
The day started at 6:30 am with an hour
and a half of yoga and meditation aimed
at guiding one’s physical actions and bodily attention via the breath. When we began walking, we were instructed to keep
our attention on our feet through the
rhythm of breath, then to extend it to the
legs, the whole body, the vegetation and
wildlife, the sky and birds, then back again.
By the end of the yatra, this rhythm had
permeated the way I moved through the
bushland. When I returned home to my
Tasmanian home at Blackstone, the aftereffects continued [3]. I moved more
slowly, I noticed more, and familiar places
felt more intensely like they were part of a
connected whole. I suggested to Trish that
we adopt on our walk a similar structure to
the yatra, to which she readily agreed.

An immersion in place
Those three days were a total immersion in
place. Even before setting foot into the
canyon proper, we could feel the change in
the air. From the blazing sun of an Australian summer day, it was only a few paces
into coolness and instant relief to our
sweaty, scratched skin. We sank into the
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shadow and the refreshing moistness
within it. We squeezed through crevices
only a foot wide in places, flattening back,
chest and arms against the rock to gain
maximum traction, extending our hands
into narrow fissures to grip a wedged stone
to pull ourselves upwards.
Investigating a side ravine that had a 90degree bend in it, I wormed my way forward on my belly, feeling every square
inch of my body in contact with sandstone
above and beneath me. Looking up at the
narrow strip of sky a hundred meters above
emphasized the feeling of being inside the
rock. It was a different sense of “insideness” than being in a cave, where one is
completely enclosed in rock but has no visual clues about how far beneath the earth’s
surface one is.
Occasionally, a large rockfall blocked a
canyon and formed a pool extending from
wall to wall so that the only way to proceed
was through the water. We wore thermal
vests over swimming costumes and were in
and out of the water all day, swimming and
wading, clambering up or under waterfalls.
The canyon walls were constantly weeping
in misty veils or seeps that dripped in syncopated splashes onto rock platforms. We
were surrounded by the sound and sensation of falling water.
The chasm floor was mostly in shadow,
but, when the angle was right, sunlight

beamed down along golden shafts.
Midway along the River Cave
canyon, one of these shafts
touched the stream, and I hastened
toward it, knowing it would remain there only briefly. I stood in
the shower of honeyed light, feeling the physicality of the rays as
they poured down from the
heights as if the proximity to the
mass of cliffs on either side had
given them added density. I turned
and smiled at Trish, who pointed
out the reflections of ripples on the
underside of the rock ledge just
above us.
As I gazed at the undulating patterns, I noticed, in the center, a
zone of opacity. It took me several
seconds to recognize my own
shadow because it was unlike any
I’d seen before—indistinct, constantly changing at the margins,
and partially translucent in the
middle where light caught the
edges of ripples. It wasn’t person-shaped at
all, but was stretching out and retracting
fluidly like an active ghost figure. I seemed
to be seeing the energy-form of my body.

A

t the end of the second day, as I sat
on a stone next to the campfire,
stirring the pot of freeze-dried kale
and turkey for dinner, I was aware of
strange rhythmical movements in the muscles of my limbs and trunk. It felt as if I
was still in the water, or perhaps more accurately, as though the creek water was
coursing through my body. We’d spent a
long while at the top of a cascade and then
beside a narrow channel, watching how the
water wasn’t flowing steadily, but in
pulses, irregular but still rhythmic surges
and retractions.
Now that I was externally at
rest, I sensed an internal pulsing in sympathy with the
rhythm of the stream. The
nearest analogy I can give is
the experience of gazing into a
fast-flowing river for some
time before transferring one’s
gaze to the riverbank and “seeing” the earth of the bank flowing into the river. In this case,
though, it wasn’t a trick of the

eye, but a distinct physical sensation, embodying the pulse of the falling water.
After dinner, we let the fire die down and
stretched out, looking up at the thin strip of
night sky strewn across with stars, appreciating the contrast between the warm ruby
light glowing from the coals close by and
the remote sapphire starlight. Trish
glanced down and exclaimed, “What’s that
star doing down there?” Below us was a
point of bluish light. I blinked uncomprehendingly at the impossibility of its location, my eyes still focused on the far distant
sky.
Then we both remembered. Glowworms! Earlier that day we’d been told that
there might be glowworms in the camping
cave, and here they were, masquerading as
stars. As the night progressed, more worms
began to glimmer until the cave walls
seemed as densely lit as the night sky. In
the darkness, I felt enveloped in the sensorium of the warmth of the fire, the soft
plashing of the stream below, and the starlight near and far. We sat for a long while,
not speaking. I let myself drift in this space
where glow-worms and galaxies appeared
equally distant, equally large.
Camping in the canyons deepens the immersion in its soundscape. In the curved,
cavernous spaces, sounds are naturally amplified rather than dissipated as they are in
flatlands. Just upstream of the camping
cave, water poured evenly from a rock
bowl several meters down into a deep hollow that resonated with a soft bass rumble.
The echoes of a waterfall farther upstream
produced one melody, while the small cascades below provided the splashing and
gurgling treble notes. The effect of the
whole was a rich and intimate soundscape
with constant variations: auditory manifestations of the pulses in the water we’d seen
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earlier. As I settled into my sleeping bag,
the water music filled the cave and filled
my body, a fitting accompaniment to the
after-images of glimmering light.

T

he canyons reveal the dynamics between rock and water in myriad
ways. Peering above me in the
River Cave, I realized I was looking back
through its 100-million-year history. The
vertical slot at the top indicated the initial
penetration of the jointing. The smooth
hollow in the southern wall immediately
below told of a bend in the young creek and
a pool. After another narrowing, an irregular broadening of the gorge on both sides
suggested a time when the stream widened
into broad rapids. And so on through millions of years, the episodes of the past laid
out vertically. I realized that it was similar
in a way to the succession of different river
environments we had encountered that
day—pools and hollows, rapids and rockfalls, narrow slots and beaches. What we
saw looking up through geological time
mirrored what we could see looking back
over the morning’s journey.
We went back to the place where I’d first
noticed the stream surges, and this time I
was struck by the effect that small-scale
features in the sandstone had on the patterns of water flow. A tiny ridge of harder
ironstone cutting transversely across the
platform sent the water to the left, resulting
in a deeper channel on that side. As the water wore away the rock, the sandstone
formed channels that guided the stream,
which then further eroded the rock in a
rhythmic pattern. This mutual influence
created a set of “flowforms” across the
rock platform, pulses of much longer duration being etched in stone [4].
High over our heads loomed cliffs that
bore the imprint of a different water-rock
interaction. When groundwater seeping
downward hits an impermeable band of
rock, it seeps out at the surface, dissolving
small amounts of mineral. As the water
trickles down the rock face, it evaporates
and leaves a mineral stain behind—black
for manganese oxides, brown for limonite,
and red for hematite.
Some of these stains hung down like
huge drapes over the cliffs, others took on
living shapes. Trish pointed out several
that looked like giant figures of Wandjina,
the enigmatic spirit beings with great dark
eyes and white faces that adorn ancient

rock art in the Kimberley region.
The first piece of art I purchased, 40
years ago, was a Wandjina figure
painted on bark by a contemporary
Aboriginal painter. To have its uncanny presence writ large on the
overhangs close to our camping
cave brought the landscape even
more fully alive for me.
The first night back after the trip,
I dreamt heavily and deeply. I woke
suddenly from a dream set by the
water in bushland. Etched in my
mind was the phrase, “invitation
into interiority.” This phrase came
with an injunction to take it seriously, and I reached for pen and paper. I understood the words to mean
that the experience of entering the
canyons silently was like going inside oneself. The form of the land—
large dark spaces, still pools, cascades, and flowforms—invites our
own perceptions of inwardness.

Interiority and the physical body
The strength of this injunction stayed with
me over the ensuing weeks and gave me
direction for further inquiry. The first step
was to look more closely at what I mean by
the experience of interiority, or what might
be termed the phenomenology of innerness. As I embarked on this exploration, I
was acutely conscious of educator Bronwyn Davies’ caution that
awareness of being embodied and, specifically, being embodied in relation to landscape, is something we have little practice
in observing or articulating. ‘The body’ is
generally understood as natural and as
such is taken for granted [5].
Davies also warns of the dangers of theorizing about body-landscapes that becomes too cerebral and disembodied.
There is a way of writing championed by
Davies in which writing “takes place in a
simultaneous separation from and immersion in the landscape” [6]. She cites the example of novelist Janet Turner Hospital
who talks of the “eroticized desire to communicate” with and about place [7].
This desire goes two ways. First, it
comes from the body’s openness to the
world, the atavistic urge to merge, the
yearning to touch and be touched. Second,
this desire comes from the land itself.

Years ago, I was part of a small group
bushwalking in the Blue Mountains, south
of the Wollemi, with a National Park
ranger who had spent extensive time with
Aboriginal people “in country,” in the
mountains and the desert. As we rested on
a ledge overlooking a rugged valley, one of
us raised the question of wilderness and
whether it was better that some country remain untouched and unsullied by human
presence.
The ranger disagreed, declaring in passionate tones that the land was “crying out”
to be walked, to be sung, to be loved. The
desire to communicate is eroticized, sensual but not sexual. I think of it as the force
of eros, with its qualities of relationship,
imagination, synthesis, and interdependence [8]. This desire is also outwardly oriented, out of that enfolded relationship and
toward others, to engage with them in an
imaginative, embodied way.
oing inside” is for me both an embodied and also a more-than-bodily experience. Having a physical
body involves proprioception, the sense of
“where our bodies and limbs are in space”
[9]. Our bodies, however, are not solid objects in space. The human trunk and cranium contain significant spaces, which
complicate the proprioceptive sense. The
little-known sense of interoception, de-

G
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fined as information about the body as perceived from within, refers to the information traveling to the brain from sensory
receptors in the lungs, gut, bladder, and
other organs [10].
Yet concentrated observation reveals a
diversity of inner spaces that range in their
accessibility to our awareness. A thousand
sensations await the person, with her eyes
closed, invited to put her attention solely
on the internal spaces within her body.
I have attempted this mode of attention
since the canyon trip, and my perceptions
have sharpened in some instances but remain diffuse in others. I am aware of several of the spaces in my cranium—the
channels inside my ears constantly ringing
with tinnitus; the sinus cavities, especially
those behind my upper left cheek that
cause my teeth to ache slightly; my tongue
resting in my mouth with a narrow connection through to my nasal passages that becomes more evident with a sharp intake of
breath through the nostrils. Much more
feebly, I can sense, by shaking my head
vigorously, that my eyes and brain are held
in fluids encased within bony hollows.
Within my trunk there is the chest cavity
connected by my breath to the bottom of
my belly, as well as the constricted channel
of the throat dropping into the stomach and
the gut below that. I am usually only
vaguely aware of the bladder as a hollow
space but can be acutely conscious of it
when it is full.
Of the other organs disposed around the
two major cavity systems, pulmonary and
digestive, I have virtually no felt sense, just
the knowledge they exist. The beating
heart is evident and, with practice, one can
discern the pulse of the arterial flow into
more and more precise points in the body.
If, in just a few months, I have noticed
some small improvement in my “inner spatial proprioception,” I can only imagine
how developed it must be in lifetime practitioners of yoga, Feldenkrais, and other
body-centered disciplines.

T

hese soft spaces and channels are
supported by the bones and muscles
of the skull, ribcage, spine, legs,
and arms. The overall sensation is of fluid
hollowness enclosed in flexible solidity
[11]. In turn, these internal spaces are
changing dynamically at different frequencies. The most obvious is the rhythmic expansion and contraction of the lungs and

gut every ten seconds
with the movement of
the breath.
Like all beginning
meditators, I was taught
to pay attention to the
breath, and particularly
to the small movements
in the body with each inhalation and exhalation.
These movements are
less and less pronounced
the farther one moves
from the chest, but on
occasion they become
subtly discernible even
in the extremities of legs
and arms. I slowly realized that we breathe
with our entire bodies, not just our lungs
[12]. Similarly, the sense of space opening
up within the body with each breath attenuates away from the lungs, but after prolonged quiet sitting, the small sensations of
expansion of inner space can permeate the
whole body.
On a longer cycle, the periodic filling
and emptying of the bladder every few
hours is evident, but for me the rumbling
emptiness before a meal followed by repletion afterward is more dramatic. There are
interactive dynamics, too. A full gut restricts the internal space available for the
breath. When I’m afraid, my breath becomes shallower, and I feel an overwhelming hollowness in my “innards.” The
heart’s beating can accentuate these sensations; a pounding pulse seems to echo
throughout my inner cavities at such times.

Interiority and self
The sculptor Antony Gormley has spent
decades producing life-sized casts of his
own body to convey what it feels like to
inhabit a human body. His partner would
encase him completely in plaster, except
for a thin straw through which he breathed.
During the hours spent while the plaster
set, Gormley reported that in contrast to the
extreme confinement of his body, he had a
sense of a vast space within himself. It took
him back to a childhood state experienced
when he was locked in a hot bedroom:
I would have to lie in this single bed not
moving with my eyes closed. I felt held in
this tiny prison behind my eyes. After a
while, I got to grips with this space, I

learned how to dwell in it. This tight claustrophobic oppressive hot space would become darker and cooler and bigger until I
was highly conscious but floating in this
deep blue dark infinity [13].
Via this experience, Gormley learned to
inhabit inner space at a very early age. The
objective space within his body, within the
bounds of the spatial fluctuations brought
about by bodily processes, didn‘t change.
What did change, however, was his subjective sense of space from hot, tight confinement to cool, effortless expansiveness
[14].
Without such enforced impetus, I have
been far slower to plumb inner space.
Nowadays, the space that feels deepest inside is behind the solar plexus, deep within
the base of the lungs and extending into the
top of the belly. The sense of spaciousness
I feel is not limited to the expanding and
contracting cubic centimeters therein.
Sometimes this lived quality feels as
though “inside” is a vast, resounding cavern and, at other times, an expanse of clear
sky or a still pool. The feeling intimates a
mobile space, sometimes quiet, sometimes
alive with memories and fleeting sensations, responsive to the quality of attention
I give it, and in turn generating more spacious attentiveness.

I

’ve not always had such impressions.
Indeed, quite the opposite. Earlier in
life, I was far from introspective. At
age 28, I was an ambitious young man in a
hurry, with a high-powered job with a
multi-national minerals company, when a
change in circumstances led to my living in
a cabin high in the Colorado Rockies with
time on my hands.
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Heavy snowfalls closed our small mining operation for the winter, and I took to
snowshoeing through the forests of Douglas Fir and Engelmann Spruce in the sparkling stillness of freshly fallen snow [15].
Over the next few years, I developed a
strong feeling for these magnificent trees
and the rocky crags, their substance and
presence. I recall saying to a friend that, in
contrast with these great beings, I lacked
any sense of my own inner being. I felt
empty. I had a PhD and other achievements, but there was nothing inside.
I remember distinctly the combination of
a physical sensation of hollow-ness in my
chest and gut, and an intangible sense of
lacking something essential. This was not
an abstract impression but a core existential experience that propelled me into radical changes in my profession and location,
into spiritual groups, and then Buddhist
practice. The impetus was my apprehension of the disconnection between the fundamental being, the “is-ness” of the trees
and escarpments, and my own sense of
self. My being was all “out there” and not
“in here.” Not for the last time, events in
my life led me into activities for which I
was ill-equipped [16].

Maps of human interiority
There are many maps of human interiority
to guide the voyager within, but the most
well developed derive from Eastern spirituality. This is not an accidental occurrence.
Diagrams of chakras and of chi energy
have evolved from centuries of diligent observation and practice within cultures
highly valuing inner experience. Chakra—
meaning “wheel” in Sanskrit—refers to
nodes of subtle energy located at various
points in the physical body.
The simplest diagram identifies seven
chakras ascending from the base of the
spine to the top of the head. In the Tibetan
system, there are three elements of a subtle
body locatable within the physical body—
first, channels (tsa); second, inner air or
winds (lung); and, third, subtle energy
(tigle). Tibetan lama Sogyal Rinpoche describes this subtle body as a “psycho-physical system” of channels through which
flow the inner winds that carry thoughts
and sense impressions [17]. Subtle energies are concentrated at various points in
the channels. Through advanced yoga
practices, this system is visualized pre-

cisely and, by directing the mind to a particular point in the body, the practitioner
can begin to purify negative thought patterns and awaken the true nature of mind.
Although I am not an advanced practitioner, I have found that years of meditation and visualization practice have activated my sense of inner space. The felt
sense I most associate with that “deepest
inside” physical space beneath the solar
plexus is what is called “heart-mind”—
open-heartedness merged with open-mindedness, related to such qualities as compassion, generosity, and gratitude.
The feeling of barren nothingness inside
is now thankfully gone. At times, the experiences of inner-ness for which I have used
the metaphors of cavern, sky, or pool are
charged with potentiality or animated by
sheer delight in being alive.

I

n the West, physical and psychological
interiority are typically treated as separate. There are many maps of the psyche within the field of psychology. Archetypal psychology, for instance, with archetypes of the masculine and feminine, and
the individual and collective unconscious,
proposes quite a different psychic structure
than the Freudian model of the id, ego, superego, and the various complexes.
Yet again, psychosynthesis posits an
“egg diagram,” with an aware self sitting
within a field of consciousness surrounded
by three levels of unconsciousness, the
lower of which contains a constellation of
un-integrated sub-personalities and the
Higher Self at the crown of the egg [18].
As far as I know, none of the schools of
psychology map these structures of awareness onto the human body, internally or externally.
Goethe’s way of science is relevant here
because the different stages of inquiry use
different mental and intuitive faculties centered on different parts of the body [19]. At
the outset, the eyes and the hand are employed in perceiving and drawing the phenomenon under study. Then follows exact
sensate imagination, an imagination of the
real in which the entire life span of the phenomenon is visualized mentally. Intuiting
the essential nature, or “gesture” of the
phenomenon occurs after prolonged familiarity, and the locus of bodily attention
shifts to the heart center. The final stage,

being of service to the phenomenon, involves acting out of compassion, ever more
deeply centered within oneself.
It seems equally possible to approach the
inner/outer experience without recourse to
spiritual, psychological, or other systems
of thought. Paying close attention to one’s
interior spaces with a quiet mind is an undertaking open to all.
My experiences so far incline me to the
view that the motto, “space, the final frontier,” is just as applicable to inner space as
it is to outer space. As Antony Gormley explains, “When we close our eyes, we are in
a space that is immeasurable and is equivalent to the deep space of the cosmos” [20].

Landscape and inner-ness
Is it possible to relate these different types
of human interiority to the form of the land
and the qualities of the places we encounter? To return to the aftermath of my
dream, in what ways do the canyon landforms resonate with my perceptions of inner space? In the first instance, the physical
description of my internal bodily spaces—
a sequence of organic cavities variously
filled with tissue, fluids, or air connected
by channels and held within a bony structure—is reminiscent of the canyon structure of a series of rock pools joined by
flowing or falling water and held within
narrow walls [21].
As with the human body, the perception
of interior spaces in a canyon is dynamic.
Physiologically, the dynamism relates to
the periodic filling and emptying of breath,
food, and waste products. In a canyon, because they are weather-dependent, the
movements are more erratic. A sudden
downpour fills a narrow chasm with ten
feet of raging water within minutes, and
lives have been lost as a result. A fierce
wind howls through a ravine and blasts
away the barrier between the soft moist
world “down here, in here” and the harsh
dry world “up there, out there.”
The analogy between body and canyon
can only be partial. For example, the human body has a network of interacting circulatory systems with many fluids flowing
in many directions, whereas the canyon has
only one fluid always flowing downhill.
The body is highly mobile and undergoes
significant changes on a scale of a few
years, whereas equivalent changes to geological formations often require tens or
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hundreds of millions of years. Nonetheless, the structural similarities have a metaphorical strength greater than their literal
validity. Sitting in the camping cave after
several days’ immersion, I did feel resonances between the internal structure of
my body, the processes within it, and the
configuration of the canyon.

S

tructural sympathies such as these
can only penetrate one’s awareness
if one allows them to. Philosopher
Val Plumwood argued that two key criteria
relating to place relationships were much
more significant than declarations of love
for that place: the attitude, or disposition
that one has toward the more-than-human
world; and the readiness to take action in
response to the place by training one’s
senses and directing one’s attention [22].
Plumwood’s claims are directly relevant
to the activity of canyoning. Trish and I
were very atypical canyoneers. A recent article on the Blue Mountains canyons described a day trip into the Danae Brook
Canyon in the Kanangra region to the south
of Wollemi [23]. It consisted of a hectic
day of heart-stopping abseiling down waterfalls, audacious plunges into deep pools,
and furious boulder hopping at the bottom:
Several short rappels and two huge jumps
follow. Robens throws himself off the
stone, howling like a free man, arms and
legs spread wide in the air, closing them
like a butterfly right before he hits the water 20 feet below. When we reach the bottom, the Danae becomes a steep boulder
field, which Robens, naked but for his pack
and tennies, practically runs across. He
leaps, lands on a slimy, snot-slick stone, almost loses his balance, finds his balance,
and leaps again, all in one fluid motion.
It’s amazing to watch, like witnessing the
movements of some earlier, better adapted
human. In an hour we cover a distance that
typically requires three. Stumbling and
falling, I watch Robens dancing and hopscotching as if he’d been born for it.
The exuberant physicality of this type of
canyoning is attractive, but it involves a
very different disposition toward the canyon than Trish and I had. The former attitude might be summarzsed as “nature as
outdoor gymnasium.” Few canyoneers
camp in the gorges overnight, which requires a good amount of gear that encumbers descents and ascents. Even fewer

would begin their day with yoga and meditation, and spend much of their time in silence.

L

ate one afternoon, I swam across a
wide cold pool rimmed with waterworn ledges and sat in a ferny
grotto next to a gushing waterfall. “Ha!” I
exclaimed. The satisfying echo suggested
to me that I explore the acoustics of the
place further, and I gave voice to one of the
Tibetan Buddhist chants I had been taught.
The bell-shaped hollows and towering
walls proved to be excellent sounding
chambers, and the effect was akin to an unaccompanied choral voice in a cathedral.
Its rich resonance encouraged me to cast
reserve aside and chant at full volume.
When I finished and sat back, resting again
in the canyon soundscape of falling waters,
it seemed as though the chanting continued
to reverberate inwardly as well as within
the mossy recesses around me. The translation of two lines of the chant reads:
Immense yin, dimension of inner space
With the radiant clarity of the sun and the
moon [24].
Although within Buddhism, these words
are directed toward the state of ultimate realization, they also ring true at a simpler
level. There have been times when I have
glimpsed a connection between the outer
appearance of the world as cliffs, cascades,
and tree ferns, and an inner world vibrating
with potentiality, on the brink of manifesting visually. It makes sense to me that
these vibrations are pictured as clear and as
radiant as moonlight. The interiority includes my inner being but is vast in scope.
I’ve approached this apperception before.
Once, after a late evening visit to the shores
of Blackstone, I wrote:
Just as the mushroom rock radiated its
particular “rock-ness” and Mount Wellington with its prominent brow radiated
its particular “mountain-ness,” so did I,
quietly sitting there, radiate my own human-ness. All three beings had an interior
aspect, and I felt a sense of spaciousness
opening up within me and beyond me [25].
The phrase “immense yin,” or vast innerness, also connects with the perspective of
depth psychology. Psychologists and writers in the Jungian tradition such as James

Hillman are concerned with modern perceptions of the world as soul-less, a situation that may lead to a profound sense of
alienation and disengagement from natural
and humanmade worlds. If soul is only
considered to be the domain of the human
psyche, there is no place for anima mundi,
the ancient Greek conception of the world
soul. Writer Peter Bishop argues that “the
term ‘inner’ has become confused spatially
as meaning inside me or you rather than as
a form of perception which sees the inside
of everything” [26].
This contention is worth a closer look. If
everything has inner-ness, then everything
in the world is participating in anima
mundi, which might well be described as
“immense yin.” If inner-ness only means
“inside me” or “inside you,” then it becomes exclusive and therefore problematic.
Bishop’s thoughts were stimulated by an
encounter he’d had on the edge of a salt
lake in the arid interior of South Australia.
A harassed family from suburban Melbourne arrived late in the evening in their
four-wheel-drive vehicle, and the father
stretched out by the fire, gazed up at the
night sky and commented how therapeutic
it was. Bishop is concerned about the psychologizing of the world in which the stars
or the desert landscape become mere tools
for modern humanity’s therapeutic benefit.
Viewing the world as an arena for personal
psychological growth seemed to him to be
puerile compared with “the ancient sublime complexity” of the Aboriginal
worldview [27].
In my search for understanding, I am interested in the connection between the
world inside a person and the interiority of
the world, physical and metaphysical. I
suggest that the process of opening to one’s
interiority in an actively receptive way
might also be an opening into the innerness of all things. In this sense, the term
“inner” could mean both “inside me or
you” and a “form of perception” or even a
way of “being in the world.”
My essential point is that the relationship
between the qualities of a place and one’s
own interiority is not a passive one: it is
enacted, requiring, at the least, an active receptivity to place and to one’s inner states.
If there is any inherent structural connection between the two, then Plumwood’s
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two criteria of disposition and physical action must be met if we are to experience
that connection. Psychologist John Shotter
coins the terms “with-ness thinking” (the
capacity to think with natural phenomena,
rather than thinking about them from the
outside), and “with-ness action” (acting in
concert with wild things rather than acting
upon them) [28].

T

here are numerous Eastern and
Western traditions of body-centered awareness that incorporate aspects of natural elements, and indigenous
cultures are particularly predisposed toward these relationships [29]. Many nature-oriented poets also invoke this mode
of engagement—Gerard Manley Hopkins,
Rainer Maria Rilke, and Walt Whitman
come to mind. Whitman’s majestic “Song
of Myself” is one long paean to the extended self and its inextricability with the
natural world [30].
As a writer, I am primarily influenced by
the written word, but other creative artists
are equally immersed in the natural world
and internalize its presence to express the
connection they feel. Philosopher Edward
Casey offers a striking example from the
history of Chinese landscape painting:
To begin with, the ancient painter identifies not with a person but with the landscape through which he wanders for years
in preparation for painting; the purpose of
the wandering is not just to note and observe but to make himself one with what he
has moved through… Moreover, this identification involves a strong factor of internalization, even to the point of pathology:
the serious painters of previous centuries,
says Shen Kua (A.D. 1031-95), “had
streams and rocks in their vitals, and
clouds and mists as a chronic illness.” But
the internalization of the landscape, whatever its risks, remains necessary so far as
painting is concerned [31].
Casey goes on to quote a maxim of
T’ang Hou (active c. 1320-30): “Unless
there are hills and valleys in your heart as
expansive as immeasurable waves, it will
not be easy to depict it” [32].

If the same were said of writers, the
standard would be set rather high. In the
next essay in this series, I examine how
several writers have approached the interiority of the self and the world, and how the
two might be related.
Notes
1. Coachwood (Ceratopetalum apetalum) and Sassafras (Doryphora sassafras) are the primary species of
trees growing in rainforest pockets in the Wollemi
canyons.
2. Yatra is the Sanskrit word for pilgrimage.
3. “Blackstone” is the name of the 55 acres of land on
Bruny Island, Tasmania. For an account of my experiences in settling on Blackstone, see J. Cameron,
Blackstone Chronicles, Bruny Island, Tasmania:
Blackstone Press, 2016.
4. Riegner and Wilkes describe an alternating pattern
of left and right deviation and rotation of flow in water that they term a “vortical meander.” See M.
Riegner and J. Wilkes, Flowforms and the Language
of Water, in D. Seamon, D. & A. Zajonc, eds., Goethe’s Way of Science. Albany, NY, State Univ. of NY
Press, 1998.
5. B. Davies, (In)scribing Body/Landscape Relations,
Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1999, pp. 14–15.
6. Ibid., p. 61.
7. J. Turner Hospital, The Last of the Hapsburgs, Collected Stories, St. Lucia: Univ. of Queensland Press,
1995; quoted in Davies, p. 237.
8. Lewis Hyde sets up the dynamic between eros and
logos that is the force of analytic thought, logic, and
market exchange in The Gift, London: Vintage, 1999.
9. N. Doidge, The Brain’s Way of Healing, London:
Allen Lane, 2016, p. 22.
10. From the Lab of Action and Body, Royal Holloway, Univ. of London website: pc.rhul.ac.uk (accessed April 18, 2016).
11. Women, obviously, have a womb, that fertile interior within which new life is nurtured. Arguably,
this gives women a richer sense of physical interiority
than men, especially in light of the experiences of the
fetus in utero, which are shared to some degree by the
pregnant mother.
12. If one considers that the intake of breath adds oxygen to the blood circulating throughout the body in
the arteries, then it is literally true that we breathe with
our whole bodies.
13. Speaking in the BBC documentary, Imagine: Antony Gormley: Being Human, first broadcast November 3, 2013.
14. The dynamic between objective and subjective
spatiality is a key aspect of Jeff Malpas’ philosophical
topography of place; see J. Malpas, Place and Experience, 2nd edn., London: Routledge, 2018.
15. Douglas Fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii) and Engelmann Spruce (Picea engelmanii) are large subalpine
trees growing high in the Colorado Rocky Mountains.
16. In chapters 4 and 6 of Blackstone Chronicles (see
note 3), I describe how, in taking on the practical
management of a large area of degraded rural land, I
had to overcome my lack of technical aptitude and habitual inattentiveness.

17. S. Rinpoche, The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying, London: Rider, 1992, pp. 248–249.
18. See R. Assagioli, Psychosynthesis, NY: Viking,
1965.
19. Goethe developed a form of scientific inquiry into
elements of the natural world that combined prolonged observation with trained intuition (see Seamon
and Zajonc, note 4).
20. See note 5.
21. Although I’m writing here about the dynamic between human interiority and the inside of canyons,
there is a much larger physical interiority at play as
well—the interior of the Earth. Canyons and other
crustal phenomena ultimately have their origin in
forces deep within the Earth. I am particularly interested in the molten iron-nickel heart of the Earth that
may be considered as its inner ocean. Its enormous
flux and surges affect everything on the surface ranging from plate tectonic movements of continents to
the variability in the Earth’s magnetic field that protects all life from the ravages of cosmic radiation and
is an orienting force for many living creatures.
Knowledge of the inner ocean and its effect provides
a larger perspective on canyonlands being folds in the
surface of an Earth with a dynamic, fluid interior.
22. V. Plumwood, Environmental Culture, London:
Routledge, 2002.
23. M. Jenkins, Australia’s Slot Canyons, National
Geographic, October 2011.
24. The word yin in Chinese philosophy relates to the
feminine principle in nature and has the connotations
of being hidden, overcastt and concealed. Norbu
Rinpoche composed the Song of Vajra with several
aims in mind, one of which was to activate the subtle
energy centers in the body with different sustained
tones. The attention is put partly on the areas of the
psycho-physical body that resonate with each tone
chanted in the original Sanskrit, and partly on the
meaning of the words themselves.
25. Blackstone Chronicles, p. 130 (see note 3).
26. P. Bishop, Tasting the Salt: Country, Reconciliation and Dream’ in J. Cameron, ed., Changing Places:
Re-imagining Australia, Sydney: Longueville Press,
2003, p. 100.
27. Ibid., p. 102.
28. J. Shotter, Goethe and the Refiguring of Intellectual Inquiry, Janus Head 8.1 (1998), p. 154.
29. For example, in the East, Tai chi involves the internal circulation of chi energy, or life force, as a result of physical movements, while Qigong emphasises the control of chi energy through deep rhythmic
breathing and moving meditation. In the West, the
Feldenkrais technique, for example, develops body
awareness through attention to ineffective habitual
movement patterns and the learning of new patterns
through slow, repeated movements.
30. W. Whitman, Leaves of Grass, London: J.M.
Dent, 1957, pp. 23–78.
31. E. Casey, Representing Place, Minneapolis: Univ.
of Minnesota Press, 2002, p. 107.
32. Ibid., p. 108.
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Questions relating to environmental and architectural phenomenology (from EAP, 2014 [vol. 25, no. 3, p. 4])
Questions relating to phenomenology
and related interpretive approaches
and methods:
❖ What is phenomenology and what does
it offer to whom?
❖ What is the state of phenomenological
research today? What are your hopes
and concerns regarding phenomenology?
❖ Does phenomenology continue to have
relevance in examining human experience in relation to world?
❖ Are there various conceptual and methodological modes of phenomenology
and, if so, how can they be categorized
and described?
❖ Has phenomenological research been
superseded by other conceptual approaches—e.g., post-structuralism, social-constructionism, critical theory, relationalist and non-representational perspectives, the various conceptual
“turns,” and so forth?
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to making a better world? If so, what are the
most crucial phenomena and topics to
be explored phenomenologically?
❖ Can phenomenological research offer
practical results in terms of design,
planning, policy, and advocacy?
❖ How might phenomenological insights
be broadcast in non-typical academic
ways—e.g., through artistic expression,
theatrical presentation, digital evocation, virtual realities, and so forth?
❖ What are the most important aims for
future phenomenological research?
❖ Do the various post-structural and social-constructionist criticisms of phenomenology—that it is essentialist,
masculinist, authoritative, voluntarist,
ignorant of power structures, and so
forth—point toward its demise?
Questions relating to the natural
world and environmental and ecological concerns:
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of nature and the natural world?
❖ What can phenomenology offer the intensifying environmental and ecological
crises we face today?
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to more
sustainable actions and worlds?
❖ Can one speak of a sustainable lifeworld?
❖ What is a phenomenology of a lived environmental ethic and who are the key
contributors?

❖
❖
❖

Do the “sacred” and the “holy” have a
role in caring for the natural world? For
places? For lifeworlds broadly?
Can phenomenology contribute to environmental education? If so, in what
ways?
Can there be a phenomenology of the
two laws of thermodynamics, especially
the second law claiming that all activities, left to their own devices, tend toward greater disorder and fewer possibilities? Are there ways whereby phenomenological understanding of lifeworld might help to reduce the accelerating disordering of natural and human
worlds?

Questions relating to place, place experience, and place meaning:
❖ Why has the topic of place become an
important phenomenological topic?
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding
of place contribute to better place making?
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to a
generative understanding of place and
place making?
❖ What roles do bodily regularity and habitual inertia play in the constitution of
place and place experience?
❖ What are the lived relationships between place, sustainability, and a responsive environmental ethic?
❖ How are phenomenological accounts to
respond to post-structural interpretations of space and place as rhizomic and
a “meshwork of paths” (Ingold)?
❖ Can phenomenological accounts incorporate a “progressive sense of place”
argued for by critical theorists like
Doreen Massey?
❖ Can phenomenological explications of
space and place account for human differences—gender, sexuality, lessabledness, social class, cultural background, and so forth?
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to the
politics and ideology of place?
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding
of lived embodiment and habitual inertia be drawn upon to facilitate robust
places and to generate mutual support
and understanding among places, especially places that are considerably different (e.g., different ethnic neighborhoods or regions)?
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to mobility, the nature of “flows,” rhizomic
spaces, the places of mobility, non-

spaces and their relationship to mobility
and movement?
Questions relating to architecture and
environmental design and policy:
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of architecture and architectural experience and
meaning?
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to better architectural design?
❖ How do qualities of the designable
world—spatiality, materiality, lived
aesthetics, environmental embodiment
etc.—contribute to lifeworlds?
❖ What are the most pertinent environmental and architectural features contributing to a lifeworld’s being one way
rather than another?
❖ What role will cyberspace and digital
technologies have in 21st-century lifeworlds? How will they play a role in
shaping designed environments, particularly architecture?
❖ What impact will digital advances and
virtual realities have on physical embodiment, architectural design, and
real-world places? Will virtual reality
eventually be able to simulate “real reality” entirely? If so, how does such a
development transform the nature of
lifeworld, natural attitude, place, and architecture?
❖ Can virtual worlds become so “real”
that they are lived as “real” worlds?
Other potential questions:
❖ What is the lived relationship between
people and the worlds in which they
find themselves?
❖ Can lifeworlds be made to happen selfconsciously? If so, how? Through what
individual efforts? Through what group
efforts?
❖ Can a phenomenological education in
lifeworld, place, and environmental embodiment assist citizens and professionals in better understand the workings
and needs of real-world places and
thereby contribute to their envisioning
and making?
❖ Is it possible to speak of human-rightsin-place or place justice? If so, would
such a possibility move attention and
supportive efforts toward improving the
places in which people and other living
beings find themselves, rather than focusing only on the rights and needs of
individuals and groups without consideration of their place context?
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